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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the key features of the evolution of the ‘European regulatory state’ 
has been ‘agencification’.1 To date, more than 40 decentralized EU agencies 
and bodies support EU institutions and Member States in making and imple-
menting European regulations. Such institutional processes have significantly 
affected the nature of the EU regulatory state, as well as the means of setting 
standards within the internal market.
EU agencies are actively involved not only in shaping the regulatory land-
scape of the EU, but also in building the EU regulatory state beyond its borders 
through a dense net of transgovernmental ties that extend to third-country reg-
ulators.2 In particular, EU agencies focus on institution building and advancing 
the state capacity of third countries to bring their regulatory standards closer 
to the EU norms.3 A recent contribution by Lavenex provides one of the 
first assessments of the EU’s regulatory governance in third countries. She 
demonstrates that non-Member States have an opportunity to align themselves 
with the standards of the EU and benefit from the ‘access to a plethora of 
committees and regulatory agencies that contribute to the development and 
1 See Madalina Busuioc, Martijn Groenleer and Jarle Trondal, The Agency 
Phenomenon in the European Union: Emergence, Institutionalisation and Everyday 
Decision-Making (Manchester, MUP 2012); see also Arndt Wonka and Berthold 
Rittberger, ‘Credibility, Complexity and Uncertainty: Explaining the Institutional 
Independence of 29 EU Agencies’, [2010] WEP 4 730, 730–752.
2 See Sandra Lavenex, ‘The External Face of Differentiated Integration: Third 
Country Participation in EU Sectoral Bodies’, [2015] JEPP 6 836, 836–853.
3 See Rimkutė and Shyrokykh, ‘The Role of EU Agencies in the Acquis Transfer: 
The Case of the European Neighbourhood Policy Countries’, [2017] TARN Working 
Paper Series 14 1, 1−19.
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implementation of EU policies’.4 She also illustrates that such integration 
has a differentiated character in contributing to the spread of the acquis (ie, 
EU legislation and regulation) in third countries. More precisely, various EU 
agencies are open to the participation of third countries, both at different points 
in time and to a different extent.
Building upon existing scholarly work, this chapter aims to systematically 
map and explain the variance across agencies’ openness to participation of 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries. We aim to examine 
whether the external dimension of EU agencies’ inclusion reflects the pursuit 
of the overarching EU foreign policy objectives as stated in Article 21 of the 
Treaty on European Union and/or echoes the objectives dictated by the need to 
find common solutions in the policy domains marked by high interdependen-
cies. Empirically, the chapter concentrates on all EU agencies involved in all 
ENP states. The period of investigation covers ten years (2007−17). The anal-
ysis builds upon primary sources and information provided by the European 
Commission and EU agencies. Empirical analysis reveals that sector-specific 
interdependencies explain EU agencies’ engagement patterns with the ENP 
countries.
The chapter contributes to the scholarship of the external dimension of 
EU agencies in two ways. The EU agency phenomenon has received much 
scholarly attention:5 the role that EU agencies play internally in the multi-level 
arrangements6 and how they impact on the functioning of the internal market 
have been explored.7 However, our understanding of the regulatory outreach 
of EU agencies beyond the EU’s borders is rather limited and only recently 
started to receive scholarly attention.8 We know very little of the extent to 
which EU agencies are involved in the EU’s external governance and the ways 
in which they contribute to this domain. This chapter, therefore, first under-
takes a systematic explanation of EU agencies’ external outreach.
4 Lavenex, supra note 2, 850.
5 For an overview, see Morten Egeberg and Jarle Trondal, ‘Researching European 
Union Agencies: What Have We Learnt (and Where Do We Go from Here)?’, [2017] 
JCMS 4 675, 675−690.
6 See Eva Heims, ‘Regulatory Co-ordination in the EU: A Cross-Sector 
Comparison’, [2017] JEPP 8 1116, 1116–1134; see also Emmanuelle Mathieu, 
Regulatory Delegation in the EU: Networks, Committees and Agencies (London, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); see also Jarle Trondal and Lene Jeppesen, ‘Images of 
Agency Governance in the European Union’, [2008] WEP 3 417, 417−441.
7 See Herwig Hofmann, ‘European Regulatory Union? The Role of Agencies and 
Standards’, in Panos Koutrakos and Jukka Snell (eds), Research Handbook in Internal 
Market Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2017), 460.
8 See also the chapters by Helena Ekelund and Merijn Chamon and Valerie 
Demedts in this book.
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Additionally, existing literature on the external dimension of EU agencies 
is predominantly based on single case studies or small-n comparisons.9 Thus, 
this chapter’s second contribution is a comparative assessment of all of the 
EU agencies that cooperate with the ENP countries. By providing a systematic 
and holistic perspective on supranational agencies’ involvement in the EU’s 
neighbourhood, this study describes the variance in the agencies’ outreach 
across policies and states.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, we briefly 
introduce the empirical phenomenon of interest − namely, the external dimen-
sion of the EU agencies. Second, we review relevant literature and introduce 
two explanations that we expect to account for the variance in the agencies’ 
involvement in the ENP region. The third section discusses the core findings 
on the involvement of EU agencies in the transfer of the EU acquis to the ENP 
region. Lastly, in the concluding section, we summarize the contribution of 
this chapter and indicate avenues for future research.
2. EU AGENCIES IN THE ENP COUNTRIES
In 2004, the European Commission stated that ENP states are eligible to 
participate in EU programmes that are ‘in the interest of the enlarged EU and 
neighbouring countries’.10 The EU declared its commitment to develop a close 
relationship with 16 neighbouring countries: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, 
Syria, Palestine, Tunisia and Ukraine. The ENP envisioned ‘the gradual 
opening of certain Community programmes, based on mutual interests and 
available resources’.11 Participation in specific programmes aims to contribute 
towards the development of administrative and state capacity needed for effec-
tive cooperation and reaching common goals. Through the ENP, the EU seeks 
to ensure stability, security, prosperity and good governance in its neighbour-
9 See Florin Coman-Kund, ‘The International Dimension of the EU Agencies 
Charting a Legal-Institutional “Twilight Zone”’, [2017] TARN Working Paper Series 
5 1, 1–22; see also Martijn Groenleer and Simone Gabbi, ‘Regulatory Agencies of the 
European Union as International Actors: Legal Framework, Development over Time 
and Strategic Motives in the Case of the European Food Safety Authority’, [2013] 
EJRR 4 479, 479−492.
10 European Commission, ‘European neighbourhood policy: strategy paper’, COM 
(2004) 373 final, Brussels, 4.
11 European Commission, ‘General approach to enable ENP partner countries to 
participate in Community agencies and Community programmes’, COM (2006) 724 
final, Brussels, 3.
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ing countries and thus subsequently ensure its own prosperity and security.12 
The organizational opening of EU agencies to the ENP countries evidently 
contributes to this goal.
In 2007 the Council of the European Union approved the participation of 
the ENP countries in the activities of some EU agencies. The participation 
of the ENP partner countries in the work of the EU decentralized agencies 
is regarded as a key element of the ENP instrument. Such a partnership is 
based on the agreement between a specific EU agency and an interested ENP 
partner country. The core precondition for the participation of the ENP country 
in EU agencies’ activities is based on the merits of the progress of the third 
countries − that is, the implementation of sector-specific reforms and compli-
ance with EU technical standards (European Commission 2011). As a result, 
involvement in the activities of EU agencies infers integration in the regulatory 
framework of the EU and is an instrument for approximation to EU norms and 
standards.
More than 20 EU agencies are open for participation by ENP partner coun-
tries. Collaboration between EU agencies and the ENP partner countries can 
manifest in two forms: (1) ad hoc arrangements (temporary project-based tech-
nical or scientific cooperation) and/or (2) special bilateral arrangements signed 
between two parties and henceforth establishing a sustained institutionalized 
link between an EU agency and an ENP country. According to the first format, 
the ENP states can gain access to the activities of EU agencies on an ad hoc 
basis − for example, various short-term arrangements aimed at institution and 
technical capacity building. They are organized via the Technical Assistance 
and Information Exchange (TAIEX) tool or via other programmes managed 
by the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations 
of the European Commission (DG NEAR). EU agencies thus have an oppor-
tunity to support the approximation, application and implementation of EU 
legislation in the ENP region. For instance, participation in TAIEX activities 
is aimed at facilitating the delivery of tailor-made expertise to address issues 
that are relevant to individual ENP countries.13 Within this setting, the primary 
beneficiary group is civil servants from ENP countries operating at national, 
subnational or local levels. TAIEX provides a platform for EU agencies to 
share their technical and scientific expertise in all fields of the EU acquis, such 
12 European Commission, ‘Wider Europe–Neighbourhood: A New Framework 
for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours’, COM (2003) 104 final, 
Brussels.
13 Karina Shyrokykh, ‘Policy-Specific Effects of Transgovernmental Cooperation: 
A Statistical Assessment across the EU’s post-Soviet Neighbours’, [2019] JEPP 1 149, 
149−168.
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as justice and home affairs, internal market, environment, agriculture, food 
safety and transport (including the aviation, maritime and railway sectors).
The second format of cooperation stipulates that EU agencies can propose 
bilateral cooperation to third countries and establish institutionalized ties 
by signing formal working/strategic/technical/operational arrangements with 
an individual ENP country. These formal working arrangements are often 
restricted to technical collaboration underlining the capacity-building function, 
as seen in the example of EU enlargement.
Within the existing legal framework, EU agencies can employ various forms 
of cooperation, be they ad hoc arrangements, bilateral working agreements 
or a combination of both. Studies focusing on a small sample of EU agencies 
(ie, the European Chemicals Agency, the European Food Safety Authority, 
the European Environmental Agency, Frontex and Europol) suggest that EU 
agencies are open to participation of third countries at different points in time, 
to a different extent, and that they propose various forms and combinations 
of cooperation to the different groups of the ENP states.14 Building on this 
observation, this study aims to explain the patchy patterns of cooperation 
between EU agencies and the ENP countries across policy sectors, agencies 
and countries.
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: 
FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES VERSUS 
SECTOR-SPECIFIC INTERDEPENDENCIES
In studies investigating external governance of the EU towards third countries, 
major attention is usually paid to the material leverage of the EU to impact 
third states’ behaviour.15 For instance, studies highlight the role played by 
conditionality attached to reforms in various sectors. The economic leverage 
is, in fact, significant, since the EU is a prominent economic actor. More 
recent literature, however, has started to pay attention to the fact that the EU 
may wield influence not just by leverage, but also by disseminating practices, 
norms and ideas.16 Existing scholarly work demonstrates that the EU’s techni-
14 Lavenex, supra note 2.
15 See Frank Schimmelfennig, ‘Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: 
Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, And Sustained Compliance in Central 
and Eastern Europe’, [2005] IO 4 827, 827–860; see also Antoaneta Dimitrova and 
Rilka Dragneva, ‘Shaping Convergence with the EU in Foreign Policy and State Aid 
in post-Orange Ukraine: Weak External Incentives, Powerful Veto Players’, [2013] 
Europe-Asia Studies 4 658, 658–681.
16 See Julia Langbein and Kataryna Wolczuk, ‘Convergence without Membership? 
The Impact of the European Union in the Neighbourhood: Evidence from Ukraine’, 
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cal assistance via various capacity-building instruments is an effective tool to 
promote legislative convergence and diffuse best practices. In addition to this, 
it can also impact on the democratic attitudes of public servants and in turn 
foster democratic change.17 This scholarship focuses on transgovernmental 
networks and the role they play. Networks established between public servants 
in Member States and the ENP countries focus on problem and sector-specific 
cooperation and are limited to a participation of professionals with recognized 
knowledge, expertise and competence in a specific policy domain or issue 
area. They stimulate the transfer of knowledge, which in turn may induce 
a change in third countries.18
Instead of focusing on the effects of such cooperation, this study addresses 
the variance existing in the degree of cooperation between EU agencies and the 
ENP states, which the literature relating to the external dimension of EU gov-
ernance has so far not sufficiently explained. A recent contribution of Lavenex 
(2015) proposes a very first appraisal of the EU agencies’ involvement in third 
countries, describing the variance in cooperation across seven EU agencies. 
We build on this contribution, but extend our focus to all EU agencies that are 
involved in the EU’s external governance activities in the ENP region.
Existing scholarly work suggests that the core drivers of the external dif-
ferentiation of EU governance in the neighbouring regions are either foreign 
policy objectives in the region and/or functional interdependencies that require 
effective cooperation for successful problem-solving.19 We tailor these expla-
nations to examine the role of EU agencies in the context of the ENP states.
The foreign policy objectives are predominantly political and are aimed at 
serving the general interests of the EU. In this logic, the inclusion of the ENP 
countries in EU agency activities is not an objective per se, but rather serves as 
a foreign policy tool that is aimed at advancing the acquis of the EU.20 Thus, 
the core aims of the inclusion of the ENP countries in EU agency activities is 
[2012] JEPP 6 863, 863–681; see also Sandra Lavenex, ‘A governance Perspective 
on the European Neighbourhood Policy: Integration beyond Conditionality?’, [2008] 
JEPP 6 938, 938–955; see also Tina Freyburg, ‘Transgovernmental Networks as 
Catalysts for Democratic Change? EU Functional Cooperation with Arab Authoritarian 
Regimes and Socialization of Involved State Officials into Democratic Governance’, 
[2011] Democratization 4 1001, 1001–1025.
17 See Shyrokykh, supra note 13; see also Tina Freyburg, ‘Transgovernmental 
Networks as an Apprenticeship in Democracy? Socialization into Democratic 
Governance through Cross-National Activities’, [2013] ISQ 1 59, 59–72.
18 Shyrokykh, supra note 13.
19 Lavenex, supra note 2; see also Frank Schimmelfennig, Dirk Leuffen and 
Berthold Rittberger, ‘The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration: 
Interdependence, Politicization and Differentiation’, [2015] JEPP 6 764, 764–782.
20 Lavenex, supra note 2.
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to prepare third countries for further integration with the EU, acquaint them 
with the acquis or signal a symbolic recognition by and acceptance into the 
European community.
The foreign policy perspective views cooperation between the ENP coun-
tries and EU agencies as one of the avenues to further extend the regulatory 
and territorial boundaries of the EU.21 To that end, EU agencies support the 
European Commission in promoting its core foreign policy agenda to enhance 
regional stability, strengthen liberal democratic values and foster regional eco-
nomic wellbeing through third countries’ approximation to the EU acquis.22
EU agencies are a part of a broader hierarchical chain supporting EU 
institutions in achieving their wider objectives. In line with this reasoning, the 
expectation is that the decision to grant the access to EU agencies’ activities for 
the ENP country is based on the integration status of the country. That is, from 
the foreign policy perspective, one would expect the deepening cooperation 
between an EU agency and an ENP country to be a result of the country’s inte-
gration attempts and status (rather than a result of sector-specific functional 
interdependencies). In this way, patterns of cooperation should mimic the level 
of integration. Hence, in accordance with this logic, we expect EU agencies to 
engage in various forms of cooperation with the ENP countries following these 
countries’ association stage with the EU. The organizational inclusion of the 
ENP countries in EU agencies’ undertakings should echo formal pledges to the 
EU acquis. The domestic pre-existing differences of the ENP countries – in 
terms of their regulations or administrative capacities – should be less impor-
tant for granting access to the participation in EU agencies’ activities because 
the core goal of such inclusion is to foster approximation to the EU acquis. 
Hence, we expect that:
Foreign Policy Hypothesis (H1): Cooperation between EU agencies and the 
ENP partner countries follows the patterns of the ENP countries’ integration 
status with the EU.
If this ‘foreign policy’ hypothesis holds, we should empirically observe the 
variance in agencies’ involvement across different groups of countries rather 
than across policy domains. The integration status of an ENP country should 
be a core factor defining the extent to which EU agencies are open to the ENP 
states. By ‘integration status’, we mean the depth of the relations between 
the EU and an ENP state – exemplified, for instance, by the conclusion of an 
Association Agreement, such as those with Ukraine (2017), Georgia (2016), 
21 Lavenex, supra note 2.
22 European Commission, supra note 11.
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Moldova (2016), Israel (2000), Tunisia (1998), Algeria (2005), Egypt (2004), 
Jordan (2002), Lebanon (2006) and Morocco (2000). Negotiations for such 
Association Agreements have also been conducted with Armenia (suspended 
since 2013), Azerbaijan, Libya (suspended since 2011) and Syria (suspended 
since 2011). There have been no negotiations with Belarus, due to its domestic 
practices that pose threats to the EU’s core democratic values. If this hypoth-
esis holds, we expect to observe that countries in more advanced stages of 
integration (ie, Association Agreements have been signed) are given greater 
access to EU agency activities. On the contrary, in countries that are in the less 
advanced phase of Association Agreements, we expect to observe only limited 
access to EU agencies’ activities. In other words, we expect this variation to be 
present across states, rather than policy fields.
A functionalist perspective proposes a different explanation. From the func-
tional interdependencies perspective, EU agencies provide expertise in key 
areas of mutual interest. Such transgovernmental networks between the EU 
and neighbouring states facilitate acquis transfer and regulatory convergence.23 
They have been featured as functional bodies shaping the Europeanization of 
neighbouring states,24 often operating as hubs or scientific communities bring-
ing together supranational and national experts.25
From the functional interdependencies perspective, openness of EU agen-
cies to participation of ENP states does not follow the ‘top-down’ patterns of 
the EU foreign policy objectives. Instead, it follows ‘bottom-up’ dynamics 
and originates from functional interdependence in a specific sector.26 The 
functional interdependencies logic suggests that cooperation between EU 
agencies and the ENP partner countries reflects policy-specific patterns of 
interdependence rather than broad foreign policy objectives. In other words, 
it is not an ENP country’s position vis-à-vis the EU that induces access to 
EU agencies, but rather policy-specific functional needs to jointly address 
common problems.
23 Shyrokykh, supra note 13.
24 Lavenex, supra note 2; Shyrokykh, supra note 13.
25 See Burkard Eberlein and Abraham L Newman, ‘Escaping the International 
Governance Dilemma? Incorporated Transgovernmental Networks in the European 
Union’, [2008] Governance 1 25, 29; see also Martino Maggetti and Fabrizio Gilardi, 
‘Network Governance and the Domestic Adoption of Soft Rules’, [2014] JEPP 9 
1293, 1293–1310; see also Emmanuelle Mathieu, ‘When Europeanization Feeds 
Back into EU Governance: EU Legislation, National Regulatory Agencies, and EU 
Regulatory Networks’, [2016] PA 1 25, 25–39; see also Kutsal Yesilkagit, ‘Institutional 
Compliance, European Networks of Regulation and the Bureaucratic Autonomy of 
National Regulatory Authorities’, [2011] JEPP 7 962, 962–979.
26 Lavenex, supra note 2.
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To define the level of interdependence between the EU and ENP states, 
we rely on the international cooperation model introduced by Botcheva and 
Martin,27 who argue that two parties considering cooperation aim to tackle 
collective action problems. Botcheva and Martin further argue that the level of 
international cooperation depends on the certain issues being addressed, as dif-
ferent policy sectors are marked by different level of externalities.28 As a result, 
the first step in identifying the level of independence is to look at the level of 
externalities of the specific policy area that two parties aim to address. In the 
case of high externalities of non-cooperation, two parties will aim to establish 
strong ties because in this way states can address common action problems 
better. In this case, states benefit from cooperating, as it increases the pay-offs 
for both. This in turn leads to higher interdependencies in policy areas that are 
marked by higher externalities of non-cooperation. In contrast, in the case of 
low externalities of non-cooperation, the outcome of one party is not affected 
by the choices of the other. Policy failures in a neighbouring country are 
unlikely to affect a situation in an EU Member State. Consequently, in policy 
sectors marked by such lower externalities, we expect lower interdependencies 
and thus less intense cooperation.
In accordance with this logic, the expectation would be that coopera-
tion between EU agencies and the ENP countries follows the pattern of 
sector-specific dynamics (ie, sectoral interdependence). We expect to observe 
the EU granting access to the ENP countries in policy areas where there is 
greater sectoral interdependence. We expect that the increase of interdepend-
encies in specific policy domains creates a necessity for cross-national coop-
eration to resolve common issues by utilizing formal and informal means.29 
Thus, the functional interdependence hypothesis reads as follows:
Functional Interdependence Hypothesis (H2): Cooperation between EU agen-
cies and the ENP partner countries follows the patterns of sector-specific 
interdependencies.
In line with this reasoning, one would expect to observe that EU agencies 
working in fields marked by higher interdependencies (high externalities of 
non-cooperation) are more involved in the external dimension of EU govern-
ance. That is, EU agencies in the interconnected issue areas (eg, border control, 
27 Liliana Botcheva and Lisa Martin, ‘Institutional Effects on State Behavior: 
Convergence and Divergence’, [2001] ISQ 1 1, 1–26.
28 Ibid.
29 See Henry Farrell and Abraham L Newman, ‘Domestic Institutions beyond the 
Nation-State: Charting the New Interdependence Approach’, [2014] World Politics 2 
331, 331–363.
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migration, transportation, and drug and human trafficking) will be more open 
to cooperation than EU agencies working in policy areas marked by lower 
interdependencies (lower externalities of non-cooperation) (eg, social regula-
tion issues such as food safety, chemicals and pharmaceuticals).
To test these hypotheses, the study draws on the analysis of primary docu-
ments of the European Commission and EU agencies (eg, internal policy doc-
uments, register of events, cooperation agreement/arrangements, Association 
Agreements). First, relying on systematic desk research, we map the coopera-
tion practices between EU agencies and the ENP countries. Second, to obtain 
this data, we contacted all EU agencies requesting them to confirm the status 
and forms of their cooperation with each of the ENP countries. All of the 
agencies responded to our request either by confirming the findings of our desk 
research or by providing additional information and clarifications regarding 
their external activities.
4. MAPPING THE ROLE OF EU AGENCIES IN THE 
EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
In this section, we describe and explain the extent to which individual EU 
agencies are involved in EU external governance. Furthermore, we explore 
whether the variance in EU agency openness to the ENP countries follows the 
broad foreign policy objectives (H1) or is rather rooted in the (sector-specific) 
functional interdependence considerations (H2).
The EU agencies’ involvement in the ENP region varies considerably across 
agencies (see Figure 10.1). Some EU agencies have both ad hoc and institu-
tionalized cooperation arrangements with the ENP states, while others only 
recently started to engage in sporadic ad hoc arrangements. Furthermore, dif-
ferent agencies became involved in the external dimension of EU governance 
at different points in time. The entire population of agencies can be assigned 
to three different groups regarding their role and engagement with the ENP 
partner states: (1) a group representing a higher degree of cooperation of agen-
cies, which combines both of the means of interaction with the neighbouring 
states (ie, ad hoc and institutionalized arrangements); (2) a group representing 
moderate cooperation of agencies, which predominantly focuses on the ad hoc 
arrangements; and (3) a group representing a lower extent of cooperation with 
agencies, which is not involved with the ENP states even though the Council 
of the European Union has given approval for such cooperation. The following 
section systematically describes each of these three groups.
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4.1 Highest Level of Cooperation
The analysis reveals that the most engaged EU agencies are the European 
Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), Frontex, Europol, the European 
Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) and the European 
Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) (see Figure 
10.1). The five agencies propose both forms of cooperation to the ENP 
countries: ad hoc cooperation activities and bilateral working arrangements. 
Furthermore, in terms of timing, the five agencies can be regarded as ‘early 
birds’, as they were the first to open for cooperation with the ENP states. This 
empirical observation gives strong support to the functional interdependence 
hypothesis, as all five agencies work in the policy areas that are marked by 
high interdependencies between the EU and the ENP partner countries. Four 
out of these five EU agencies work closely with the ENP partner countries (ie, 
Frontex, Europol, CEPOL and the EMCDDA) and contribute to the policies 
of Justice and Home Affairs. In the Justice and Home Affairs configuration, 
interdependencies are highest, as this includes issues such as border control, 
immigration flows and drug trafficking, which require joint problem solving. 
All five EU agencies are focused on capacity building and on establishing 
strong institutional ties with the ENP countries, as demonstrated in the discus-
sion that follows.
EASA cooperates widely with authorities in the ENP partner countries in 
order to raise their regulatory standards in the aviation safety domain. EASA 
aims to support the implementation of comprehensive Aviation Agreements, 
and seeks to develop common safety standards and procedures, as well as to 
further foster cooperation between EASA and the ENP countries themselves. 
Working agreements signed between EASA and the authority of an ENP 
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country exclusively cover issues of a technical nature.30 EASA has already 
signed arrangements with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Israel, Moldova, 
Morocco and Ukraine. Besides its more institutionalized ties with the ENP 
countries, EASA continuously arranges ad hoc technical cooperation pro-
jects (eg, Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA) and the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership). The projects are carried out in close cooper-
ation with local ENP authorities and stakeholders, and are aimed at advancing 
regulatory and oversight competences of national aviation authorities.
In a similar vein, Frontex, CEPOL and Europol offer many opportunities 
for cooperation (both ad hoc and bilateral arrangements). For instance, coop-
eration with third countries is a fundamental part of the formal mandate of 
Frontex. The agency claims that ‘building external relations is a valuable tool 
for effectively handling irregular migration and cross-border crime in accord-
ance with EU’s Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy’.31 Moreover, 
Frontex continuously works on developing and maintaining close cooperation 
with the authorities of third states. The partnerships are usually established 
with the law enforcement authorities responsible for border control to work 
towards effective border management capacities. Frontex emphasizes that its 
highest priority is to create firm technical cooperation with immediate neigh-
bours, as well as with those third countries bordering the southern neighbour-
hood countries. Frontex has signed working arrangements with the authorities 
of five ENP countries: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Belarus, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. The agency is in various negotiation stages of discussions with the 
authorities of Libya, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia.
Furthermore, Frontex oversees several technical assistance projects in 
non-EU countries via the TAIEX tool managed by the European Commission. 
Frontex liaises with the ENP partner countries in the areas of information 
exchange, research and development, risk analysis, training, pilot projects 
and joint operations. Examples include initiatives such as the Migration 
and Mobility Partnerships, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) Initiative and the 
Building Migration Partnerships.32 The latter projects, for instance, support the 
realization of IBM across borders of the EaP countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The project aims to provide training 
individually tailored to the specific needs of beneficiaries to ‘facilitate smooth 
30 See Florin Coman-Kund, European Union Agencies as global actors – a legal 
study of the European Aviation Safety Agency, Frontex, and Europol (Maastricht, 
Universitaire Pers Maastricht, 2015).
31 See Frontex, ‘Third Countries’, (2017), http:// frontex .europa .eu/ partners/ third 
-countries/ , last accessed 25 October 2018.
32 Ibid, 31.
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border crossing for legitimate travel and trade and at the same time to prevent 
cross-border crime’.33
In addition, Frontex works together with the European Asylum Support 
Office (EASO) to support the external dimension of the Common European 
Asylum System, engage with third countries to reach common solutions and 
provide third countries with capacity-building and regional protection pro-
gramme. For instance, EASO has implemented an ENPI project (2014−16) 
with Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco. The core objective of the project was to 
familiarize officials from Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan with the mandate of 
EASO and Frontex, and to introduce the tools and instruments that the two EU 
agencies use. EASO aimed to assess the technical needs of the three countries 
in order to provide them with suitable tools to support capacity building to 
respond to these needs.
CEPOL and Europol cooperate with the relevant bodies of the ENP 
countries in the field of law enforcement. Corresponding capacity building 
targeting police authorities in third countries is a priority of CEPOL. To that 
end, CEPOL is regularly involved in regional training activities. In these activ-
ities, CEPOL works together with Europol; however, Europol focuses mostly 
on the ENP countries that have signed cooperation agreements (Moldova, 
Ukraine and Georgia), while CEPOL engages in various ad hoc arrangements 
with all ENP partner countries. CEPOL is an active contributor to TAIEX 
activities, where it oversees the regional MEDA/MEDA JAI programmes and 
the European Police Exchange programmes. It regularly provides workshops 
targeting the national law enforcement agencies from the ENP countries on 
issues such as police conduct and use of powers, police activity in a democ-
racy, cross-border police cooperation, management and police ethics, police 
activity in a democracy, police conduct and use of powers, as well as combat-
ing cyber-terrorism.
In its training activities, CEPOL cooperates with Eurojust. Eurojust repre-
sentatives provide training at CEPOL courses, seminars and conferences on 
a regular basis. Besides these ad hoc demand-driven arrangements, CEPOL 
has concluded a cooperation agreement with Georgia and has signed working 
arrangements with Armenia and Moldova. Meanwhile, Eurojust has signed 
cooperation agreements with Moldova and Ukraine.
Among the most engaged EU agencies is the EMCDDA. The EMCDDA’s 
cooperation with the ENP countries ranges from coordination of technical ad 
hoc assistance projects to consultative support and training. The core objective 
of such cooperation is to share the EMCDDA’s monitoring practices, data col-
lection tools and guidelines, as well as to assist the ENP countries in creating 
33 Ibid, 31.
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their own national drug information systems. The EMCDDA cooperates with 
the ENP countries to exchange data and methodologies for monitoring the drug 
situation and organizing joint training activities. Almost all ENP countries 
are participants in the EMCDDA’s ad hoc activities which are implemented 
through the TAIEX tool. The core objective of the EMCDDA’s ad hoc 
arrangements is to strengthen the capacity of ENP partner states to respond to 
emerging challenges and the most recent developments of the drugs situation. 
Four ENP countries have already signed a memorandum of understanding with 
the EMCDDA: Ukraine, Moldova, Israel and Georgia.
The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) aims to 
establish technical cooperation on the prevention and control of communicable 
diseases.34 Its long-term objective is to create a set of procedures and tools for 
technical cooperation with the ENP countries and establish well-functioning 
contacts for cooperation. The ECDC, however, has signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding and an Administrative Agreement solely with Israel.
The aforementioned patterns of cooperation between EU agencies and the 
ENP partner countries support the functional interdependence hypothesis 
suggesting that agencies fulfil roles dictated by higher externalities. That is, 
EU agencies related to the fields marked by higher sector-specific mutual 
dependencies are considerably more active in the ENP region, in comparison 
to other agencies.
When we further analyse the patterns of cooperation by looking at the ENP 
countries that receive most attention from EU agencies, two core patterns 
emerge (see Figure 10.2). First, a group of countries that has an advanced 
integration status is, on average, more integrated into EU agencies’ activities. 
Hence, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Israel are among the ENP countries 
that have obtained the most access to EU agencies. However, countries that 
signed their Association Agreement with the EU earlier (Tunisia in 1998, 
Algeria in 2005, Egypt in 2004, Jordan in 2002, Lebanon in 2006 and Morocco 
in 2000) than Ukraine (2017), Georgia (2016), Moldova (2016) and Israel 
(2000) follow the uneven patterns of integration into EU agency activities. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence does not provide a systematic explanation 
of the variance in the extent of cooperation. For instance, although Belarus is 
among the least integrated ENP states, having no formal association status, it 
has had a working agreement with Frontex since 2009. Security and border 
protection cooperation between the EU and Belarus is rather developed, 
34 See ECDC, ‘Partnerships’, (2018), https:// tickmaps .ecdc .europa .eu/ en/ about -us/ 
partnerships -and -networks/ partnerships, last accessed 25 October 2018.
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despite low democratic standards.35 Hence, the results suggest that the foreign 
policy hypothesis does not provide a full and systematic explanation of the 
detected patterns, although it cannot be completely rejected either.
The second pattern reveals that EU agencies working in fields marked by 
higher levels of interdependence are more open to institutionalized cooperation 
with the ENP countries (see Figure 10.2). That is, EASA, Frontex, CEPOL and 
the EMCDDA are most engaged with a group of ENP countries (Moldova, 
Georgia, Ukraine, Israel, Azerbaijan and Armenia). Such findings in turn 
provide additional empirical support that these patterns reflecting foreign 
policy objectives are less pronounced compared to the empirical evidence 
pointing to the (sector-specific) functional interdependence patterns. This 
empirical evidence strengthens the functional interdependence hypothesis, as 
we find that EU agencies working in certain policy fields – that is, security and 
safety-related areas – are more open to cooperation with the ENP states.
4.2 Moderate Cooperation
The second group of agencies – the European Global Navigation Satellite 
Systems Agency (GNSS), the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the 
European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), the European Environment Agency 
(EEA), the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), the European Agency 
35 For more on functional cooperation, see Giselle Bosse, ‘A Partnership with 
Dictatorship: Explaining the Paradigm Shift in European Union Policy towards 
Belarus’, [2012] JCMS 3 367, 367–384.
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for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA), the European Fisheries Control 
Agency (EFCA) and the European Union Agency for Railways (ERA) – are 
engaged in cooperation with the ENP countries via ad hoc arrangements. 
However, none of these agencies has established institutionalized ties with 
neighbouring countries (eg, as opposed to EASA, Frontex, Europol, CEPOL 
and the EMCDDA). The empirical evidence reveals that the EU regulatory 
agencies working in the food safety, chemicals, health, environmental protec-
tion and railways policy domains form informal transgovernmental networks 
(as opposed to strong institutionalized ties by, for instance, signing working 
arrangements with the ENP countries). In the informal transgovernmental net-
works, EU agencies provide the ENP countries’ regulators with individually 
tailored technical or scientific expertise. In doing so, they contribute to the 
extension of the EU regulatory state beyond its borders; however, the interac-
tion is organized via ad hoc arrangements in which agencies often contribute to 
the ENP framework through the TAIEX instrument or are involved in various 
cooperation activities arranged by DG NEAR.
This finding lends further support to the functional interdependence hypoth-
esis − that is, agencies operating in the policy fields marked by lower inter-
dependencies are expected to be engaged with the ENP countries to a lesser 
degree than agencies working in the domains of high interdependencies (eg, 
border control, migration, drug and human trafficking). Provided that the EU 
and the ENP countries do not manage to establish strong ties in the food safety, 
chemicals, health, environmental protection and railways domains, the exter-
nalities of non-cooperation to the EU are moderate (ie, the EU can still main-
tain high food, chemical and medicine safety standards within the common 
market regardless of the level of the safety standards in the ENP countries). 
In what follows, the section further specifies how EU agencies working in the 
aforementioned policy fields cooperate with the ENP regulatory authorities.
GNSS has a long and continuous track record of overseeing multiple 
infrastructural projects in the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood. It closely 
works with its local partners to promote the use of the European Geostationary 
Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) and Galileo within the region. Activities 
are aimed at helping regional countries to embrace and adopt European GNSS 
technology, with a focus on civil aviation and other transport domains. GNSS 
is active in providing training sessions and technical assistance to the ENP 
countries to prepare them for the EGNOS standards.
EFSA is becoming increasingly involved in cooperation with the ENP states. 
Although EFSA’s involvement with the ENP started in 2009, a more sustained 
cooperation with the EU neighbouring countries via the programme funded 
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from the ENP instrument began in 2014.36 Through the existing cooperation 
programme, EFSA aims to improve the ENP states’ integration into its core 
work and responsibilities. In particular, developing and maintaining working 
relations and scientific cooperation with the EU’s neighbourhood is a priority 
to EFSA for the coming years (EFSA 2014). Through this programme, EFSA 
is aiming for greater integration of the ENP region. EFSA works with the 
EU neighbours to transfer EU food safety regulations and consumer safety 
standards. EFSA’s focus is on scientific cooperation with partner countries. To 
this end, EFSA focuses on exchanging information regarding risk assessment 
and risk communication practices, and on sharing expertise on handling food 
crises.
In a similar vein, ECHA has been involved in the EU technical assistance 
programmes since 2009. Since 2011, ECHA has provided training events for 
the authorities from the ENP countries upon their ad hoc requests.37 Examples 
include presentations on the EU classification labelling and packaging legisla-
tion, the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals 
legislation and the safety management of chemicals.
EMSA manages training and capacity-building activities and technical 
assistance projects in the beneficiaries of the ENP states.38 Common con-
cerns of the EU Member States and the ENP partner countries bordering the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea are maritime safety, maritime security 
and protection of the marine environment. EMSA is implementing two sepa-
rate projects for technical assistance (SAFEMED IV and Black and Caspian 
Seas Region) in the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood. The core objective 
is to unify national, European and international stakeholders with the purpose 
of enhancing the security and safety of marine environment standards. To 
achieve this goal, EMSA assists the ENP countries in the implementation of 
the international maritime conventions and helps them to build the necessary 
administrative capacity to prepare and implement these conventions. The 
approximation of the ENP countries’ national legislation to the relevant EU 
standards is also an objective of projects implemented by EMSA. EMSA 
pursues these objectives by providing the ENP countries with training, tech-
nical support, tools and services. The specific needs of project beneficiaries 
are addressed through targeted bilateral technical assistance. Pilot projects 
in the area of pollution detection and sharing of maritime traffic information 
36 See EFSA, ‘International’, (2018), www .efsa .europa .eu/ en/ partnersnetworks/ 
international, last accessed 25 October 2018.
37 See ECHA, ‘International Cooperation’, (2018), https:// echa .europa .eu/ about -us/ 
partners -and -networks/ international -cooperation, last accessed 25 October 2018.
38 See EMSA, ‘Partnerships’, (2018), www .emsa .europa .eu/ about/ cooperation 
.html, last accessed 25 October 2018.
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are implemented to incentivize cooperation between beneficiaries and the EU 
Member States.
EEA has ad hoc cooperation with the ENP partner countries. In the period 
from 2010−15, it supported the implementation of the Shared Environmental 
Information System (SEIS) principles and good practices in the countries 
of the European Neighbourhood, covering EaP countries and Southern 
Mediterranean partner countries.39 The SEIS programme aims to strengthen 
the steady creation of environmental indicators and assessments, with the 
ultimate objective of creating knowledge-based policy making and good 
governance in the ENP partner countries. EEA’s support and technical assis-
tance are tailored to the identified national priority areas and therefore target 
country-specific needs.
EU-OSHA became involved in ad hoc technical cooperation later (in 2014) 
than other regulatory agencies (eg, EFSA, ECHA and EEA). Furthermore, 
it pursues different goals from other EU agencies. The core aim of the ad 
hoc arrangements of EU-OSHA is to establish a single contact point in each 
country and involve the ENP partner countries in the work of the agency. In so 
doing, EU-OSHA aims to create a platform for sharing information and best 
practices with the local safety and health networks. Such links have been estab-
lished with Algeria, Israel, Morocco, Palestine, Tunisia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
EFCA oversees the international dimension of the Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP), as well as combating illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) activi-
ties.40 EFCA is obliged to assist the Commission in strengthening operational 
coordination and regulatory compliance in third countries. To achieve this 
objective, EFCA participates in ad hoc capacity-building training missions in 
the ENP countries with which the EU has a sustainable fisheries partnership 
agreement. The core goal of such missions is to assist countries in the develop-
ment of inspection of training programmes. Furthermore, EFCA supports the 
Commission in the framework of the IUU Fishing Regulation. It also assists 
states in fulfilling their responsibilities by organizing workshops and seminars 
for national administrations on the application of the Regulation.
ERA only became involved with the ENP partner countries more recently.41 
ERA oversees the EUMedRail Project (2017−20), which aims to improve the 
operations and efficiency of the Mediterranean transport system. ERA works 
39 See EEA, ‘International Cooperation’, (2018), www .eea .europa .eu/ about -us/ 
who/ international -cooperation, last accessed 25 October 2018.
40 See EFCA, ‘International Operations’, (2018), https:// efca .europa .eu/ en/ content/ 
international -operations, last accessed 25 October 2018.
41 See ERA, ‘Cooperation’, (2018), www .era .europa .eu/ The -Agency/ Cooperation/ 
Pages/ home .aspx ?UniqueID = FAQ & filterValue1 = -1, last accessed 25 October 2018.
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closely with the southern region countries of the ENP (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine and Tunisia) to foster regulatory 
reforms.
The European Medicines Agency (EMA) constitutes an exception, as it does 
not cooperate with the ENP partner countries. Health is not an eligible domain 
of the ENP programme.42 Furthermore, EMA cannot invite third country par-
ticipants as observers to attend Committee and product-related meetings, for 
confidentiality reasons. EMA has signed a working agreement with regard to 
pharmaceuticals with Israel only (2013).
4.3 Limited Cooperation
The third group of agencies has very limited engagement with the ENP 
partner countries. For instance, the Foundation for Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions and the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) 
report no activities with the ENP partner countries. EIGE, for example, par-
ticipates in informal meetings with EU agencies working with the ENP coun-
tries to share experiences and good practices. However, EIGE has reported 
no concrete activities aimed at addressing gender equality standards in the 
neighbouring regions − for example, ad hoc training or other capacity-building 
arrangements. This empirical observation provides additional support for the 
functional interdependencies hypothesis, as the agencies that are least involved 
(or not at all involved) work in the policy fields that are marked by relatively 
low interdependencies, such as the European Centre for the Development of 
Vocational Training and the EU Agency for Fundamental Right. This finding 
in turn suggests that the promotion of human rights and democratic values (by 
including EU agencies that oversee these issues) does not play a core role in 
defining the extent and focus of cooperation with (these) EU agencies.
5. CONCLUSIONS
EU agencies introduce a new format of EU external governance that operates 
beneath the surface of EU centralized decision making. Supranational agencies 
boost technocratic transgovernmental cooperation by providing access to sci-
entific expertise and know-how experience, as well as by proposing a range of 
formal and informal cooperation arrangements.
42 See EMA, ‘International Activities’, (2018), www .ema .europa .eu/ ema/ index 
.jsp ?curl = pages/ partners _and _networks/ general/ general _content _001848 .jsp & mid = 
WC0b01ac0580c4d3fe, last accessed 25 October 2018.
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Agencies’ contribution to the expansion of the EU regulatory state beyond 
its borders can follow two different organizational dynamics: cooperation 
driven by the foreign policy objectives of the EU or sector-specific functional 
interdependencies. The empirical findings of the study confirm that the exter-
nal dimension of EU agencies has a differentiated character − that is, different 
agencies are involved in various regulatory sectors to different degrees. 
Additionally, the extent to which EU agencies engage in the acquis transfer 
varies from time to time and from country to country.
The evidence presented in the chapter suggests that this variance predom-
inantly follows the sector-specific interdependence dynamics rather than 
the overall foreign policy goals of the EU. The strongest, most sustainable 
cooperation has been established in those policy fields that are by nature trans-
boundary, as predicted by the functional interdependence hypothesis. In line 
with this hypothesis, issues relating to security, border control and migration 
take a very prominent role when it comes to the external dimension of EU 
agencies. The EU agencies working in these policy fields marked by higher 
functional interdependencies (eg, border control, migration and international 
crime) establish cooperation with the ENP states earlier than their counterparts 
working in other policy areas (eg, food safety, chemicals, health, environ-
mental protection and pharmaceuticals). Furthermore, agencies in the field of 
Justice and Home Affairs (as well as EASA) are open to stronger and more 
intense cooperation with the ENP states compared to EU agencies overseeing 
other policy domains.
In contrast, there is little empirical evidence to suggest that cooperation 
between EU agencies and the ENP partner countries follows the patterns of the 
ENP countries’ integration status with the EU, as the foreign policy hypoth-
esis would predict. We do find that the ENP countries with a more advanced 
integration status (ie, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine and Israel) cooperate with 
EU agencies more than other ENP states. However, we detect little empirical 
support that this cooperation extends to policy areas beyond security-related 
issues.
This chapter has provided a systematic overview of the transgovernmental 
outreach of EU agencies to the ENP countries across different policy domains. 
It has illustrated that the EU agencies take an active role in the extension of 
the EU regulatory state beyond its borders. However, multiple research gaps 
remain to be filled by future scholarship. For instance, we do not know whether 
the involvement of EU agencies in transgovernmental outreach enables third 
countries to actually align with EU standards and regulations.43 Furthermore, 
43 See Karina Shyrokykh and Dovilė Rimkutė, ‘EU Rules Beyond its Borders: 
The Policy-Specific Effects of Transgovernmental Networks and EU Agencies in 
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we know little of what the most favourable conditions for a positive effect 
of such regulatory involvement in the neighbourhood are. Therefore, future 
research should assess the effects of EU regulatory transfer by examining 
whether the involvement of EU agencies in regulatory outreach in third coun-
tries can bring the standards of ENP countries closer to the EU’s norms.
the European Neighbourhood’, https:// onlinelibrary .wiley .com/ doi/ epdf/ 10 .1111/ jcms 
.12883, last accessed 5 July 2019.
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